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CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER*

Fragile Ecosystems: Preclusive
Restoration in the Antarctic
ABSTRACT
The Antarctic is a pristine frozen wasteland and a delicate ecosystem. To preserve and protect this region, certain states have
committed themselves to a legal regime that performs "preclusive
restoration."This regime pursues a purposeful strategy that aims at
revitalization and restoration of the Antarctic environment by
implementing norms to prevent degradation and depletion of the
Antarctic ecosystem and its resources. A series of international
agreements have been carefully crafted by these states to implement
this strategy. Thus far, preclusive restorationhas operated successfully. It is protectingand conserving Antarctic flora and fauna, seals
and other living marine resources in the circumpolarseas, and the
Antarctic environment in general. Most recently, preclusive
restoration has been evidenced in the rejection of a negotiated
Antarctic minerals regime, a 50-year ban placed on the exploitation
of mineraland hydrocarbonresources in the region, and the adoption
of measures to control marine pollution, manage waste disposal,
furnish environmental impact statements, and protect special areas.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Antarctic contains the earth's most pristine ecosystem. It is
a region that, because of its remote, desolate and forbidden nature, has
largely escaped the pervasive environmental degradation wrought by
human activities. At the same time, the Antarctic ecosystem is among the
world's most fragile. Both on land and at sea, the ecosystem in the frozen
south is highly simplified and intensely susceptible to perturbation. The
primitive nature of life on the continent, coupled with the simple
character of the food chain in circumpolar waters, make the Antarctic
ecosystem especially vulnerable to intensive ecological disruptions.
This study concerns restoration and the Antarctic ecosystem.
Some comment is needed, however, about concepts. The notion of
restoration as regards fragile ecosystems conjures up certain images. One
immediately visualizes scenes of environmental collapse and degenera-
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tion. There is a perceptible need to fix that situation, to rehabilitate that
ecosystem to its former healthy condition. Restoration entails a process
that involves renewal and revitalization from decay to well-being;
restoration enables perceptible recovery of strength and vigor from a
situation of degradation and weakness. Restoration suggests renovation
of an impaired ecosystem to a much improved condition, either naturally
or through carefully designed, manmade strategies.
In the case of the Antarctic ecosystem, no pervasive manmade
eco-catastrophe has yet occurred that might warrant massive restoration.
As a fragile ecosystem the Antarctic has not yet been so severely
disrupted as to necessitate large-scale restoration efforts. The Antarctic
remains relatively pristine. Yet this situation is not one wholly of
happenstance or natural occurrence. It has been brought about by
intentional, human design.
The Antarctic continent and its circumpolar seas have been
purposefully protected through a nexus of treaty arrangements by certain
states having direct interests in and commitments to the region. This
multifaceted legal situation for the Antarctic has produced an administrative regime to govern human activities in the region. In that process, the
legal arrangement has generated policies that are termed here as
"preclusive restoration"-the intentional effort by concerned governments
to preempt damage to the fragile Antarctic ecosystem by devising specific
legal instruments to protect and conserve the south polar environment.
"Preclusive restoration" is not a term used officially or scientifically by
governments engaged in Antarctic activities. Even so, it does aptly
characterize the intent and effects of environmental policies for the
Antarctic adopted by those governments during the last three decades.
This article examines the multidimensional efforts at preclusive
restoration in the Antarctic from a threefold perspective. First, the study
explains the fragile nature of the Antarctic ecosystem. In this way, we can
better appreciate the sensitive quality of the region's environment.
Second, an assessment is performed of the multifaceted contributions
made by various international agreements to effect preclusive restoration.
This is the core of the treatment, as it examines what, why and how new
measures were taken to prevent certain activities from degrading the
Antarctic environment. Finally, the study concludes by suggesting some
lessons learned about restoring fragile ecosystems from the Antarctic
experience. In this way, successful international efforts in the frozen south
might give rise to new attitudes and policies for applying preclusive
restoration elsewhere.
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IL THE FRAGILE ANTARCTIC ECOSYSTEM
The Antarctic is a region of environmental paradoxes. On the one
hand, the area of the frozen continent, 5.5 million square miles or about
one-tenth the earth's land surface, ranks fifth among continents in size,
larger than only Europe and Australia. Yet, as the circumpolar seas freeze
over during winter, sea ice expands the size of the continent to some 8
million square miles, making the white continent smaller only to Africa
and Asia. Antarctica is also the harshest of continents. It is the coldest
continent, with average temperatures of -20P C along its doast, but
dropping to -40o to -70D C in the interior. The coldest temperature ever
recorded, -89.6° C, was measured at the Soviet's Vostok station on July
21, 1983. It is also the windiest continent, with katabatic winds blowing
off the polar plateau at speeds of up to 200 miles per hour. And yet,
Antarctica remains among the most vulnerable of continents. A shoeprint
made on an infrequent patch of moss will stay visible for years, as that
vegetation struggles to regenerate in the persistent cold.Antarctica's massive ice sheet, which is three miles thick in
places, contains 90 percent of world's ice, constituting 70 percent of global
fresh water supplies. As such, Antarctica is the world's wettest continent.
Yet, Antarctica is also a white deserL Precipitation averages less than two
inches annually, making Antarctica the earth's driest continent, and
world's largest desert. Ringing nearly the entire continent are massive
shelves of ice, from which huge portions break off to form great tabular
icebergs that float out to sea.2
Antarctica is the only continent without trees and grasses. It has
only two species of flowering plants. There are no land vertebrates,
reptiles, or amphibians there. The largest terrestrial animal is a wingless
midge. The continent is striking as a vast wasteland. Yet, the surrounding
polar seas are nutrient rich, and among the earth's most biologically
productive. The Southern Ocean, approximately one-tenth of the earth's
ocean surface, is the world's most coherent ecosystem, with an incredibly
rich web of life. There phytoplankton proliferate, supplying pervasive
feeding zones for zooplankton, up the food chain to shrimp-like crustacea
called krill, and then to fish, squid, birds, seals and whales. In terms of
3
biomass, the Southern Ocean ranks among the world's most fertile.
But Antarctic seas are also among the world's most vulnerable
marine ecosystems as well. Only three tropic levels earmark the food
1. For more detailed discussion on Antarctica's ecosystem, see C. Joyner, Antarctica and
the Law of the Sea 10-16 (1992).

2. For an assessment of Antarctic ice and its status under international law, see Joyner,

I-Cm=er Regions in InternationalLaw, 31 Nat. Re. J. 213 (1991).
3. See the discussion in Joyner, supra note 1, at 22-31.
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chain in the Southern Ocean's marine ecosystem. At the lowest level of
the food chain are krill and zooplankton, on which most other marine life
feed. The second level includes creatures like squid and fish that prey on
lower tropic organisms, but are also preyed upon. At the third level are
whales, seals, penguins and other sea birds. The importance of krill in
this configuration is evident. Multiple species are dependent upon krill.
If the krill population in the Southern Ocean were overexploited or killed
off by environmental degradation, higher prey species in the ecosystem
would be directly impacted. That would produce adverse ramifications
for the entire ecosystem, not just for one species.
The problematic nature of the food chain is complicated by
uncertainty; the total amount of krill in the Antarctic ecosystem is
unknown. Permissible levels of exploitation remain more guesstimates
than precise scientific determinations.4
All this suggests that the Antarctic ecosystem is relatively simple
and, hence, highly vulnerable to outside perturbation. This scientific
realization over the last three decades has promoted the incremental
evolution of a legal regime expressly designed to preserve and protect the
Antarctic. ecosystem from human activities on land and at sea. It is this
Antarctic legal regime that has been entrusted with promoting and
maintaining multifaceted policies of preclusive ecosystemic restoration
throughout the region.
III. PRECLUSIVE RESTORATION AND THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM
The fragile nature of the Antarctic ecosystem prompted a
practical conclusion among scientists and diplomats: The most effective
way to restore the Antarctic ecosystem would be to minimize man's
impacts upon it. Environmental restoration in the polar south could best
be accomplished through prevention, which required genuine commitments of international cooperation among states conducting activities in
the region. To that end, international reaction to perceived threats came
in an ad hoc manner, by addressing each threat as it became apparent.
Specific concerns for preclusive restoration in the Antarctic initially
focused on the conservation of flora and fauna on the continent, then
progressively turned to seals at sea, marine living resources, and mineral
resources. Preclusive restoration for the Antarctic ecosystem recently
culminated in fashioning an agreement for effecting comprehensive
environmental protection for the region. As a result, the strategy of
4. See Laws, The Ecology of the Southern Ocean, 73 Am. Scientist 28,38-39 (1985); Knox, The
Living Resources of the Southern Ocean, in Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and
Political Issues 27, 27-34 (F. Vicfina ed. 1983).
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preclusive restoration, coupled with the promotion of scientific cooperation and peaceful uses only of the region, became explicit principles
driving the evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).
A. Early Restoration Strategies,1959-1990
1. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty
Antarctica and the marine ecosystem south of 600 South Latitude
fall within the legal scope of the Antarctic Treaty.5 This agreement,
negotiated in 1959 and entering into force in 1961, was principally
designed to promote scientific cooperation in the region. Preclusive
restoration was not an original purpose of the agreement. No provision
in the Antarctic Treaty specifically directs any party to preserve, protect
or restore the regional environment. The Treaty does nonetheless contain
provisions that require nonmilitarizatlon6 and denuclearization of the
area,7 as well as freedom of scientific research and cooperation and the
obligation to settle disputes peacefully. These stipulations obviously
furnish support for creating conditions that facilitate safeguarding the
environment of the continent and its surrounding seas. 10
The Antarctic Treaty also provides that the contracting parties
should function as a special decisionmaking group, which has become
known as the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs). n Included
in this group are those signatory states that have acquired policymaking
authority under the Treaty.12 This group and its legal activities are self5. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 US.T. 794. It is important to realize that portions of
Antarctica are claimed by seven states-Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand,
Norway, and the United Kingdom. The Antarctic Treaty had to finesse the claims situation
between those claimant states and all other parties, which steadfastly refuse to recognize the
lawful validity of those claims. Article TV in the Antarctic Treaty accomplishes this, as it
essentially commits parties to agree to disagree over the status of the claims so that the
work of the Antarctic Treaty can go forward. For discussion of the claims, their legal bases
in international law, and the importance of Article IV in ameliorating the situation, see
Joyner, supra note 1, at 41-74.
6. Antarctic Treaty, supranote 5, art. I, 12 U.S.T. at 795. For discussion, see Joyner, Non-

Militarization of the Antarctic: The Interplay of Law and Politics 42 Naval War College Rev.

(1989).
7. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 5, art. V, 12 U.S.T. at 796-97.
8. Id. art. 111, 12 U.S.T., at 796.
9. Id. art. XI, 12 U.S.T., at 799.
10. The Antarctic Treaty also provides for use of an unannounced, on-site inspection
system of "[a]ll areas of Antarctica, including stations, installations and equipment within
those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or
personnel in Antarctica ... ." Id. art. VII, 12 U.S.T. at 797.
11. Id. art. IX, 12 U.S.T. at 798.
12. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, which possess full voting membership
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creating, self-implementing and self-administering. The policies, which
are adopted by consensus in Consultative Party Meetings, are called
recommendations and presently exceed 200 in number. Most recommendations deal with environmental matters or logistical concerns, and they
are legally binding, albeit only on the ATCPs. The critical point here is
this: It is the Consultative Party group that has taken on the responsibility to carefully consider, negotiate, and implement several legally binding
agreements into what has become the Antarctic Treaty System. It is this
system that has evolved into the legal regime expressly designed to
promote and uphold policies of preclusive restoration amongst the
ATCPs throughout the Antarctic.
Designated among the "principles and objectives of the Treaty"
is "preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica." 13
While the Antarctic Treaty says nothing more about this aim, the
Consultative Parties have met periodically since 1961 to devise means for
protecting Antarctica's environnment, inclusive of circumpolar marine
areas. In this connection, the ATCPs have taken a number of specific
actions that bear directly on the Antarctic environment. Significantly, all
of these actions complement ambitions for preclusive ecosystemic
restoration.
2. The 1964 Agreed Measures
In 1964 the Consultative Parties negotiated a set of specific
measures to transform the region of Antarctic Treaty jurisdiction into a

among the Antarctic Treaty parties, presently count 26 states as members. The twelve
original parties to the Antarctic Treaty (viz., Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union [Russia], the United Kingdom,
and the United States) comprised the initial group of Consultative Party states. Since the
Antarctic Treaty's entry into force in 1961, Consultative Party status has been granted to
certain states that have demonstrated "substantial [scientific) research activity" in and

around the continent. The Antarctic Treaty, supranote 5, art. IX,12 US.T. at 798. As of 1994,
the following additional states have been admitted to the Consultative Party group: Brazil,
China, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, South Korea, Netherlands, Peru, Poland,
Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay. These ATCPs work in biennial meetings (that will be annual
after 1994) to set recommended policy for the Antarctic.
There are also certain contracting states that have ratified the Antarctic Treaty, but
have not opted to become ATCPs. Included among this group of Non-Consultative Parties
in 1994 are: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece,
Guatemala, Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Papua New Guinea,
Romania, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), created in 1958 during
the International Geophysical Year, has become the principal advisory body on scientific
matters for the ATCPs.
13. Id. art. IX, 12 US.T. at 798.
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"Special Conservation Area." The Agreed Measures for the Conservation
of the Antarctic Fauna and Flora,14 annexed to ATCP Recommendation
111-8, provided governing rules for the conduct of activities affecting the
Antarctic environment on land. The Agreed Measures aim specifically to
protect mammals, birds, and plant life on the continent and prohibit the
introduction of nonindigenous flora and fauna into the region. The
instrument is made applicable to the area south of 600 South Latitude,
including all ice shelves.15
As regards the fragile terrestrial Antarctic ecosystem, the Agreed
Measures provides for the establishment of Specially Protected Areas
(SPAs).'6 Included among SPAs are designated islands and marine areas,
which are to be accorded special protection to preserve their "unique
natural ecological system." Another variety of protected area, Sites of
Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), was created in 1972." These categories
permit sites to be designated with two distinct levels of protection. The
more stringent is the SPA, which intends to preserve ecological systems
that are unique to or of outstanding scientific interest in Antarctica. SSSIs
were created to protect areas where scientific investigations might be at
risk from outside interference, or are of particular scientific interest and
merit long-term protection. In 1987 the Marine SSSI category was
introduced," and since then, five such sites have been designated.
Both categories now require management plans. Entry into an
SPA is prohibited except by permit, which is issued only for a compelling
scientific purpose that can not be served elsewhere, and then only in
accord with the appropriate management plan. Persons entering SSSIs
generally are not required to have permits, although domestic law of
some Antarctic states may require it of their nationals. At least 20
Specially Protected Areas had been designated by 1994."

14. Certain Recommendations of Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, June 2-13,
1964, 12 U.S.T. 992, 996 (modified by Certain Recommendations of the Fifteenth Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting, Nov. 22, 1968).
15. Like the Antarctic Treaty, the Agreed Measures assert that nothing in them -shall
prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under
international law with regard to high seas within the Treaty Area, or restrict the
implementation of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty with respect to inspection." Id. at
996-97.
16. Id. art. VIII, 17 U.S.T. at 999.
17. See Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System 3301 (J.Heap ed., 8th ed. 1994).
18. See Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System, supra note 17, at 2098.
19. The following sites had been designated SPAs by 1994: Taylor Rookery, MacRobertson
Land; Rookery Islands, Holme Bay; Ardery Island and Odbert Island, Budd Coast; Sabrina
Island, Balleny Islands; Cape Hallett, Victoria Land; Dion Islands, Marguerite Bay, Antarctic
Peninsula; Green Island, Berthelot Islands, Antarctic Peninsula; Cape Shirreff, Livingston
Islands, South Shetland Islands; Moe Island, South Orkney Islands; Lynch Island, South
Orkney Islands; Southern Powell Island and adjacent islands, South Orkney Islands;
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3. The 1972 Seals Convention
Another prominent step was taken to protect marine life in the
Southern Ocean as the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals
was promulgated in 1972." Though aimed at limiting the vulnerability
of Antarctic seals to commercial exploitation from over-harvesting, this
agreement was intended to "promote and achieve the objectives of
protection, scieritific study and rational use of Antarctic seals, and to
maintain a satisfactory balance within the ecological system."1
The Seals Convention applies to all seal species south of 60r
South Latitude.' Under the instrument, seals are considered a marine
resource and principles of sustainable yield are applied to prevent
overharvesting. The Seals Convention designates annual catch limits for
three species: for crabeater seals, 175,000; for leopard seals, 12,000; and for
Weddell seals, 5,000.1 Total protection is given to three other species,
the Ross, southern elephant, and southern fur seals.' Six Sealing Zones
are defined, each of which is alternatively dosed on an annual rotation
basis.' Three Seal Reserves are designated where the taking of seals is
forbidden.2
4. The 1980 Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR)2' well exemplifies the strategy of preclusive
restoration. This convention, negotiated in 1980 and entering into force
in 1982, reflects a premeditated effort by the ATCPs to negotiate a
regulatory instrument before exploitation of living ocean resources-in
particular, krill stocks-posed serious threats to the stability of the
circumpolar marine ecosystem.
Largely because of this imperative, CCAMLR is by far the most
comprehensive among the ATS instruments in jurisdictional scope, as its
ambit extends "to the Antarctic marine living resources of the area south

Coppermine Peninsula, Robert Island; Litchfield Island, Arthur Harbor, Palmer Archipelago;
North Coronation Island, South Orkney Islands; Lagottellerie Island, Marguerite Bay; and
"New College Valley," Caughley Beach, Cape Bird, Ross Island. Handbook of the Antarctic
Treaty System, supra note 17, at 2184-2244.
20. Done June 1, 1972, 27 US.T. 441.
21. Id. at 443.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 478.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Done May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476.
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of 60 South latitude and to the Antarctic marine living marine resources
of the area between that latitude and the Antarctic Convergence which
form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. " 2s The boundary of the
CCAMLR conservation zone thus ranges as far north as 500 to 620 South
Latitude.
CCAMLR was intended to preserve Antarctic marine living
resources, inclusive of fish, crustaceans (i.e., krill), creatures on the
continental shelf and bird life. Regulations governing the harvesting of
seals, however, are left to the 1972 Seals Convention, and conservation
policies pertaining to whales are deferred to the International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling.'
As noted already, the Antarctic marine food chain functions
simply and is therefore highly vulnerable to disruption. The key species
is krill, which serves as the food source for fish, squid, penguins, seals
and baleen whales. Consequently, under CCAMLR, conservation is
understood to mean "rational use," which strives to uphold three main
principles among parties to the convention. These are to: (1) Maintain
populations at sustainable levels; (2) Maintain ecological relationships
among harvested, dependent and related populations; and (3) Avoid
changes in the marine ecosystem that are not likely to be reversible over
the subsequent two or three decades."
Importantly, conservation is to be carried out through a holistic
"ecosystemic approach." That is, living resources will be managed by a
systematic assessment of the ecological interrelationships between species
and their physical environment.3 Critical here is the need to assimilate
information and scientific advice that will enable maintaining a balanced
ecological interdependence between harvested species and their dependent predators. For that purpose, CCAMLR created a special Scientific
Committee to study the Southern Ocean and make policy recommendationsF and a Commission to adopt and implement policies aimed at
conservation and preclusive restoration. 3 Finally, it should be noted
that, in addition to approving some 75 special fishery conservation
measures, in 1991 the Commission adopted a "precautionary ceiling" on
krill harvesting for various conservation zones in the Southern Ocean,
especially around St. George Island. Moreover, an official CCAMLR-

28. Id. art. I(1) at 3479.
29. Id. art. VI at 3481.
30. d. art. 1(3) at 3479-80.
31. Id.
32. Id. arts. XIV and XV.
33. Id. arts. VII-XIII at 3482-87. For detailed analysis of CCAMLR, see Joyner, supra note
1, at 221-62.
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sponsored inspection system to check vessels fishing in Antarctic waters
has been in operation since 1990.?
5. The 1988 AntcticMinerals Convention
From 1982 through 1988 the ATCPs negotiated a special regime
for the regulation of prospecting, exploration, and development of
mineral resources in the Antarctic, if ever such activities should occur
there. Agreement came in June 1988 on the text for a new minerals
agreement, and in November 1988 the Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) was opened for
signature in Wellington, New Zealand.3
CRAMRA was expressly designed as an instrument for preclusive
restoration. No minerals activities were ongoing in the Antarctic, and
none were being immediately contemplated by any national government.
The ATCPs rightly reasoned that a stronger, more protective agreement
might be fashioned if negotiated before prospecting and exploration
activities were under way, at a time when the mineral stakes in question
were unknown and principles were being negotiated, rather than tangible
assets. The logic here was patently one aimed at preclusive restoration.
CRAMRA provided a specific framework to regulate Antarctic
minerals activities. To this end, the minerals convention created new
institutions, set out impressive environmental restrictions, and established
legally binding procedures to ensure that minerals activities could go
forward only with the consensus approval of all contracting parties. The
minerals agreement provided for inspection, monitoring, reporting,
compulsory settlement of disputes, access to courts, and suspension of
activities causing unacceptable damage to the environmentm
The Wellington Convention made notable contributions to the
Antarctic Treaty System. It finalized the resource protection regime under
the ATS--along with those instruments for fauna and flora, seals, and
living marine resources. It provided regulations and environmental
standards to govern minerals activities. It furnished a negotiated, agreedupon consensus approach for regulating mineral activities that would
impinge upon sensitive questions of national sovereignty and environ-

34. For discusion see Joyner, supr note 1, at 24647.
35. Done June Z 1988, 27 LL.ML 859 [heInafier Wellington Convention). For discussion
of the negotiations that produced this agreement, see Joyner, The Antarctic Minerals

Negoting Promess, 81 Am. J. Intl L 888 (1987); F. Vicilna, Antarctic Mineral Exploitation:

The Emeing Frmwork (1988).
36. For analysis of the miners treaty and its operational provisions, see Joyner, 1988
Antarcti Mineras Comn

on, 1 Marine Pol'y Rep. 69-85 (1989); R. Wolfrn, The Convention

on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (1992).
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mental protection in Antarctica. CRAMRA created formal machinery to
address those issues. It supplied innovative environmental provisions,
chief among them the principle that one may not proceed with mineral
activities unless sufficient information were available about exploration.
Importantly, the sufficient information requirement involved a process
checked by the need for consensus agreement by all parties.
These preclusive attributes aside, the Wellington Convention was
never legally consummated as part of the Antarctic Treaty System.
Critical doubts about the negotiated minerals regime were translated by
environmentalists into potent political weapons. Most disturbing was that
the Wellington Convention came to be viewed more as permissive, rather
than preclusive in its inevitable effects. That is, having a minerals treaty
in force would not be a deterrent to minerals development; it would in
fact serve as a prominent springboard for eventually promoting development activities. CRAMRA wittingly or unwitting would become the
slippery slope leading to exploitation and development of mineral
resources in and around Antarctica.
Environmentalists refused to view CRAMRA as an instrument of
preclusive restoration. On the contrary, they reckoned that the agreement
would provide incentives for commercial mineral activities. Its entry into
force would remove the moratorium policy of voluntary restraint and
make commercial mining lawful, though admittedly under restrictive
conditions. These developments would increase the likelihood that
commercially exploitable deposits might be discovered. Opening the door
to mine legally would permit prospecting, which could lead to mineral
discoveries, that would foster exploration and eventual exploitation. That
pattern could not help but eventuate into environmental degradation of
the Antarctic ecosystem, both on and offshore.7
By mid-1989, political circumstances had scuttled the prospects
for the Wellington Convention. Two governments essential for the
implementation of CRAMRA-Australia and France--announced that
they would not ratify this agreement. By so doing, any possibility of the
mineral convention's entry into legal force was effectively preempted.'
37. For discussion of the principal objections to CRAMRA, see Joyner, CRAMRA The Ugly
Duckling of the Antarctic Treaty System?, in The Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics 161,
170-173 (A. Jorgensen-Dahl & W. 0streng eds., 1991).
38. Press Release from the Prime Minister for Australia. Joint Statement with the Ministerfor

Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans QC, and the Minister for Arts, Sport, the
Environment, Tourism & Territories, Senator the Hon. Graham Ricardson (May 22, 1989). See
Scott, Australia Advocates Wilderness Statusfor Antarctica, Christian Science Monitor, May 24,

1989, at 4; Browne, Franceand Australia Kill Pacton Limited AntarcticMining and Oil Drilling,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,1989, at A10. Under Article 62 of the Wellington Convention, all seven

states that have claims to the continent would have to sign and ratify the convention for it
to enter into force. Both Australia and France are claimant states. See Joyner, supra note 1,
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It is important to realize that other considerations of preclusive
restoration partially prompted the Australian (and subsequently the
French) decision to change course on a minerals treaty for the Antarctic.
Four publicized environmental disasters in polar waters early in 1989 no
doubt seized the Hawke government's attention: On January 28, the
Argentine supply ship Bahia Paraisohit rocks offshore the United States'
Palmer Research Station on the Antarctic Peninsula, spilling some 250,000
gallons of diesel fuel into the sea; in the process thousands of krill and
scores of penguins and other sea birds were killed, and several scientific
projects along the coast were ruined. On February 7, the British resupply
ship HMS Endurance hit an iceberg near Deception Island, reportedly
creating an oil spill in Esperanza Bay. On February 28, the Peruvian
research vessel BIC Humboldt ran aground and leaked oil in Fildes Bay off
King George Island. These three Antarctic episodes were far overshadowed by the Arctic disaster on March 24 when the tanker Exxon Valdez
struck a reef off Prince William Sound, Alaska. More than 11 million
barrels of crude oil spilled into the frigid waters, killing thousands of
otter, birds and fish, as it washed ashore along a 45-mile pollution
3
zone.

The Exxon Valdez tragedy in the Arctic dramatically demonstrated
the severe costs and real risks of transporting crude oil in frigid waters.
It is true that domestic political considerations and the desire to retain
Australian sovereign influence in its Antarctic sector claim-which covers
two-fifths of the continent-remained prominent motivations behind
Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke's decision to abandon CRAMRA. Nevertheless, the widespread international publicity generated by the
Exxon Valdez eco-catastrophe clearly played into the decision by the
Australian government to oppose the minerals treaty.
Demise of the CRAMRA agreement also opened the diplomatic
door for the ATCPs to consider and negotiate a far more significant
instrument for comprehensive environmental protection of the Antarctic
environment. Diplomatic efforts at preclusive restoration in the Antarctic
again gathered momentum, beginning in October 1989 with the XVth
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meeting in Paris. Stimulated by a
joint Australian-French proposal for comprehensive measures to protect
the Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems,' four other states-Chile, New Zealand, the United States and
Sweden-submitted draft proposals for comprehensive protection

at 45-46. Thus, by their refusal even to sign the treaty, those governments effectively
precluded the possibility of the agreement's entry into force.
39. See Antarctic & Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) Information Paper No. 1,
Implications of Alaskan Oil Spill for the Antarctic (May 9, 1989).
40. See Final Report of Fifteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 202-13 (1989).
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measures at the Paris ATCP meeting.4 1 The upshot was a formal
decision to convene a special ATCM meeting in Vifia del Mar, Chile. This
gathering, which convened from November 19-December 6, 1990,
produced a draft proposal that laid the foundation for developing a
comprehensive regime for protecting the Antarctic environment
Preclusive restoration of the Antarctic ecosystem had evolved into a raison
d'etre for parties to the Antarctic Treaty System.
B. The 1991 Madrid Environmental Protection Protocol
Emerging out of three special ATCP meetings in Vifia del Mar,
Chile (November-December 1990) and Madrid, Spain (in April and June
1991) came a new instrument for preclusive restoration in the Antarctic.
On October 4, 1991 the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty' was adopted and opened for signature by the ATCPs
in Madrid, Spain. The Protocol stands among the most comprehensive,
far-reaching multilateral environmental agreements ever promulgated. It
is futuristic, common sensical and provides a legal blueprint for
preclusive restoration of the Antarctic. Also significant, the Madrid
Protocol signals a profound reversal in the ATCPs' intentions for the
Antarctic. Whereas during the late 1980s policies of the Consultative
Party group were being directed toward possible exploration for and
development of Antarctic minerals and hydrocarbons, by late 1991 that
course had been diverted toward a general legal obligation to protect and
conserve the continent and its circumpolar seas. Restoration of the fragile
Antarctic ecosystem had been accomplished through consensus by the
Antarctic Treaty parties in a legally binding, preclusive fashion.

41. See Id. at 214, 227, 237, 243.
42. Impasse over the minerals issue largely dominated the discussions at Vifla del Mar.
In the session's closing hours, however, a Draft Protocol on the Antarctic Environment was
submitted on a personal basis by Norway's Rolf Trolle Andersen. This so-called Andersen
Draft succeeded in supplying compromise provisions for a broad, generalized environmental regime for the Antarctic and became adopted as an unofficial working draft text in
subsequent sessions of the Eleventh Special Consultative Meeting. For discussion of policy
positions and negotiations during the Vifla del Mar meeting, see Joyner & Ewing, Antarctica
and the Latin American States: The Interplay of Law, Geopolitics and Environmental Priorities,4
Geo. Int'l Envtl. L Rev. 1, 33-41 (1991).
43. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, XIth Special
Consultative Meeting in Madrid, June 21, 1991, 30 LLM. 1455 [Hereinafter Madrid
Environmental Protocol). The protocol was signed then by 23 of the 26 Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties and by 8 Non-Consultative Parties. Statement of James Neil Barnes and
Beth Claudia Marks to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on the
Antarctic Environmental Protection Protocol, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., at 7 (1992) (mimeograph).
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1. The Protocol as Preclusive Restoration
The Madrid Protocol was designed to implement comprehensive
regulation over activities affecting the Antarctic environment. It sets up
uniform standards for human activities on and around the continent that
replace the tangled nexus of recommendations, codes of conduct and
different international conventions having varied legal effects. It provides
a framework through which ATCPs can fill gaps as needs arise. It aims
to promote consistency of regulation, which can lead to rational
application of environmental standards.
To these ends, the Protocol obligates parties to consider the
Antarctic (i.e., the area south of 60r South Latitude, inclusive of ocean
space) as a "natural reserve devoted to science" and commits them to
comprehensive protection of the region's environment.L " Most importantly, it commits ATCP governments to policies of preclusive restoration
aimed at preserving and protecting Antarctica's fragile ecosystem, on
both land and at sea.
The preamble to the Madrid Protocol reaffirms the special
responsibility of the ATCPs "to ensure that Antarctica does not become
the scene or object of international discord," and recalls "the designation
of Antarctica as a Special Conservation Area... to protect the Antarctic
environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems." The
fundamental premise undergirding the Protocol is stated in Article 3:
'The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and
associated ecosystems and intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its
wilderness and aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct
of scientific research, in particular research essential to understanding the
global environment, shall be fundamental considerations in the planning
and conduct of all activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.'" This marks
a notable advance over previous Antarctic law, which only applies to
Antarctic Treaty states in the conduct and support of their scientific
activities. The Protocol applies to all governmental and nongovernmental
activities of states party, including tourism by.their nationals.
Building on this premise, three guiding principles aimed at
preclusive restoration of the Antarctic ecosystem are set out in Article 3:
(a) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and
conducted so as to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems;
(b) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and
conducted so as to avoid:

44. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 2, supra note 43, at 1462.
45. Madrid EnvironmentalProtocol, art. 3(1), supra note 43, at 1462.
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(i) adverse effects on climate or weather patterns;
(ii) significant adverse effects on air or water quality;
(iii) significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including
aquatic), glacial or marine environments;
(iv) detrimental changes in the distribution, abundance or
productivity of species or populations of species of fauna
and flora;
(v) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or
populations of such species; or
(vi) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological,
scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance;
(c) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and
conducted on the basis of information sufficient to allow prior
assessments of, and informed judgments about, their possible
impacts on the Antarctic environment and dependent and
associated ecosystems and on the value of Antarctica for the
conduct of scientific research.4
To assist in attaining these ambitions, the Protocol requires "regular and
effective monitoring" that will permit assessment of the impacts of
ongoing activities, as well as substantiation of predicted impacts.
Article 3 is pivotal to furnishing four legally-binding preclusive
principles aimed at sustained restoration of the Antarctic ecosystem.
These principles, which take the form of duties, include the following: (1)
Parties are obligated to meet specific environmental standards and to
limit insofar as possible adverse impacts on the environment; (2) Parties
are obligated to give priority to scientific research in Antarctica and to
preserve Antarctica for global research; (3) Parties are obligated to ensure
that human activities are planned and carried out on the basis of
information sufficient to permit prior assessments of their possible
impacts;
and (4) Parties are obligated to conduct environmental monitor47

ing.

The Madrid Protocol places a flat prohibition on all mining activity in
Antarctica: "Any activity relating to mineral resources, other than
scientific research, shall be prohibited." This ban, however, is not
permanent. While no moratorium period is specified, modification or
amendment of the Protocol may be done at any time, provided that all
ATCPs agree by consensus.' In addition, 50 years after the Protocol

46. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 3, supra note 43, at 1462-63.
47. Importantly, much of the substance of Article 3 in the Madrid Protocol is borrowed
from Article 4 in the Wellington Minerals Convention, save for the significant difference that
Article 3 in the Protocol strives to apply uniform standards in a comprehensive fashion for
all human activities in the Antarctic, not just those that might be related to minerals
development. See Wellington Convention, art. 4, supra note 35, at 870-71.
48. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 7, supra note 43, at 1464.
49. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 25, supra note 43, at 1464.
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enters into force, the prohibition can be lifted if adopted at a Review
Conference by a majority of all ATCPs, including three-fourths of current
ATCPs, and then ratified by three-fourths of the ATCPs, 'including the
ratifications of all States that were Consultative Parties at the time of the
adoption of this Protocol."s
That caveat aside, the Protocol ostensibly ensures that no minerals
development can lawfully take place on Antarctica or in its circumpolar
waters within the foreseeable future. This prohibition means that
degradation of Antarctica is not likely to occur from minerals or
hydrocarbon development or transportation activities on or around the
continent. Nor is it likely that natural habitats of Antarctic living marine
resources will be disrupted or destroyed by such activities for at least
fifty years." Such a policy process embodies the essence of preclusive
restoration for fragile ecosystems.
The Madrid Protocol creates a new institutional body, the Committee
for Environmental Protection (CEP).1 Each party is entitled to membership on the CEP. The CEP is intended to oversee compliance with the
Protocol, but lacks both independent capabilities and the power of
compulsory enforcement sanctions. The CEP is given no decisionmaking
authority. The chief function of the Committee will be to provide advice
and formulate recommendations to ATCP meetings concerning implementation of the Protocol and its annexes.'

50. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 25(4), supra note 43, at 1470.
51. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 25, supra note 43, at 1470. However, pursuant to
a U.S. proposal, any state has the right to withdraw from the provisions of the protocol
(presumably giving it the right to mine without regulation) if an amendment lifting the ban
is enacted but not ratified within five years of its proposal.
52. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 11, supra note 43, at 1465.
53. Madrid Environmental Protocol, arts. II and 12, supra note 43, at 1465-66. Specifically
in this regard, the Committee is to furnish advice orn
(a) the effectiveness of measures taken pursuant to this Protocol;
(b) the need to update, strengthen or otherwise improve such measures;
(c) the need for additional measures, including the need for additional
Annexes, where appropriate;
(d) the application and implementation of the environmental impact
assessment procedures set out in Article 8 and Annex I;
(e) means of minimizing or mitigating environmental impacts of activities
in the Antarctic Treaty area;
(f) procedures for situations requiring urgent action, including response
action in environmental emergencies;
(g) the operation and further elaboration of the Antarctic Protected Area
system;
(h) inspection procedures, including formats for inspection reports and
checklists for the conduct of inspections;
(i) the collection, archiving, exchange and evaluation of information related
to environmental protection;
(P the state of the Antarctic environment; and
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The CEP will perform valuable functions by supplying advice so as to
ensure that environmental rules are interpreted uniformly and consistently by all parties. It might also serve as a forum for investigating
controversial environmental matters, for assisting in the proper preparation of environmental impact statements, and for reaching common
interpretations of key terms and threshold levels in the Protocol.' Still,
the Committee lacks real authority to enforce compliance with the
Protocol, or to define mandatory environmental conservation zones, or to
send out inspection or monitoring agents to conduct oversight of human
activities in Antarctica.
Compliance is left to governments party to the Madrid Protocol.
Indeed, parties are obligated to take "appropriate measures" to ensure
compliance with the ProtocoL.' The Protocol also provides that inspections of stations, installations, equipment, ships and aircraft within the
Antarctic Treaty area should be carried out "to promote the protection of
the Antarctic environment and associated ecosystems, and to ensure
compliance with this Protocol."' There are duties as well to follow
procedures for mandatory dispute settlement" and to perform advance
environmental impact assessment studies for proposed activities in the
Antarctic. 6
2.

The Annexes

Five annexes are attached to the Madrid Protocol, which supply
the main pillars on which preclusive restoration in the Protocol rests.
These annexes respectively deal with environmental impact assessment,
conservation of fauna and flora, waste disposal and waste management,
marine pollution, and protected areas that are to be implemented in
furtherance of the environmental protection of Antarctica. The annexes
"form an integral part" of the Protocol and are be adopted in line with
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty.?
Annex I marks a major achievement of the Protocol, as it sets
procedures for environmental impact assessment (EIA).w For devising
environmental impact assessment, human activities are divided into those
(k) the need for scientific research, including environmental monitoring,
related to the implementation of this ProtocoL
Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 12(1), supra note 43, at 1466.
54. Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition Information Paper No. 1, A Critique of the
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection 4 (1991) [hereinafter ASOC
Critique].
55. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 13, supra note 43, at 1466.
56. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 14, supra note 43, at 1466-67.
57. Madrid Environmental Protocol, arts. 18, 19, and 20, supra note 43, at 1468-69.
58. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 8, supra note 43, at 1464.
59. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 9, supra note 43, at 1465.
60. Madrid Environmental Protocol, supra note 43, Annex I, at 1473.
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having "less than a minor or transitory impact"; those having "a minor or
transitory impact"; or those having "more than a minor or transitory
impact."61 It is regrettable, however, that these terms are neither scientifically defined nor precisely explained in either Article 8 of the Protocol
(which deals with environmental impact assessment) or in Annex I.
Interpretation and implementation of environmental impact assessment
procedures is left to the discretion and responsibility of each party.
Conservationists have pointed out that such a loophole might unravel
essential qualities of preclusive restoration inherent in an EIA requirement.
The mandate for Annex I stems from Article 3 in the Protocol.
This provision affirms the principle that activities will be "planned and
conducted on the basis of information sufficient to allow for prior
assessments of, and informed judgments about, their possible impacts on
the Antarctic environment."' To this end, the annex adopts a three-stage
procedure for undertaking environmental impact assessment. First,
preliminary assessments for proposed activities are to be conducted by
parties "in accordance with appropriate national procedures."' Second,
an Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) will be performed for activities
"likely to have not more than a minor or transitory impact" by the party
proposing the activity." And third, preparation of a Comprehensive
Environmental Evaluation (CEE) is required for activities deemed 'likely
to have more than a minor or transitory impact." Once prepared, the CEE
will then be circulated to all parties and the public for comment.'
These procedures constitute a significant step towards environmental protection. Even so, had the Committee for Environmental
Protection been given greater responsibility for environmental impact
assessment, preclusive restoration might have been strengthened. More
extensive CEE involvement would probably improve the quality and
consistency of the assessment process at each stage. As it now stands, the
burden of assessment remains primarily with those parties planning the
activities. This notwithstanding, no final decision can be taken to proceed
with a proposed activity until the draft evaluation has been considered

61. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex I, arts. 1, 2 and 3, supra note 43, at 1473-75.
62. Madrid Environmental Protocol, art. 3 (21(c)), supra note 43, at 1462.
63. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex I, art. 1, supra note 43, at 1462.
64. Madrid Environmental Prot+wol, Annex I, art. 2, supra note 43, at 1462.
65. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex I,art. 3, supranote 43, at 1462-63. No decision
to proceed with the proposed activity can be taken by the proposing party until the draft
CEE has been considered by a Consultative Party Meeting, provided that the decision to
proceed has not been delayed longer than 15 months from the date on which the draft CEE
was first circulated. Afterwards, a final CEE must be prepared that includes and addresses
comments received and decisions reached. Id. art. 3(5) and (6).
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by an Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meeting on the advice of the
Committee."
Annex IIrestates the need for conservation of Antarctic fauna and
flora and updates the Agreed Measures.' That relatively few substantive
changes were made to the Agreed Measures in this annex attests to the
former's sustained value and proven contribution as a regulatory
mechanism. Three notable improvements are made by Annex II in the
conservation regime for Antarctica. First, protection is extended to
terrestrial and freshwater invertebrates;" second, a ban is placed on the
presence of dogs in Antarctica after April 1, 1994, and third, significant
damage to native terrestrial plants is included within the definition of
"harmful interference" to the Antarctic environment. 70 Annex II contains
little that is new. Still, it remains important for integrating the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora into a more comprehensive, comprehensible environmental protection structure and for reasserting the essential
need to conserve indigenous wildlife in the Antarctic.
The third annex pertains to waste disposal and waste management." It grew out of the 1975 Code of Conduct for Antarctic Expeditions and Stations Activities' and from Recommendation XV-3, which
upgraded the 1975 Code." Annex I generally improves upon the 1975
Code. It places stronger emphasis on retrograding waste and other
materials from the continent and standardizes collection and circulation
of information on waste management.
Waste is classified under Annex III into five main groups: Group
1 contains sewage and domestic liquid wastes; Group 2 contains other
liquids and chemicals, including fuels and lubricants; Group 3 wastes are
solids to be combusted; Group 4 contains other solid wastes; and Group
5 wastes are radioactive materials. 4 The annex requires that parties
remove all Group 2, 4, and 5 wastes if generated after the annex's entry
into force. Parties are obligated, moreover, to remove Group I wastes "to
the maximum extent possible" from the Antarctic Treaty area.
Still, Annex III has problems and flaws. For one, provisions retain
numerous qualifiers, such as "to the maximum extent practicable" and "as
far as practicable." These are indefinite, subjective parameters that could

66. Id. art. 3(5).

67.
68.
69.
70.

Madrid
Madrid
Madrid
Madrid

Environmental
Environmental
Environmental
Environmental

Protocol,
Protocol,
Protocol,
Protocol,

supra note 43, Annex U, at 1479.
Annex I, art. 6, supra note 43, at 1478.
Annex I, art. 4(2), supra note 43, at 1473.
Annex H, art. 1 (h(v)), supranote 43, at 1476.

71. Madrid Environmental Protocol, supra note 43, Annex UI, at 1479.

72. See Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System, supra note 17, at 2062.
73. Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System, supra note 17, at 2063.
74. See Madrid Environmental Protocol, supra note 43, Annex I1, art. 8, at 1479,1481-82.
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make it difficult to hold operators fully accountable for their actions.
Conservationists also criticize acceptance of incineration by the annex as
an environmentally safe form of waste disposal. The fact of the matter is
obvious: Incineration pollutes the air and also produces contaminated,
toxic ash that must be disposed of. Further, sewage and liquid wastes
present more concerns. Annex III relies on maceration (i.e., softening by
soaking in a liquid over time) as a principal means for dealing with such
waste products.7 This method, however, can fail to disintegrate heavy
metals, bacteria, viruses and other chemical contaminants remaining in
the waste matter. The annex also explicitly permits discharge of liquid
wastes directly into the sea. 7' Environmentalists would prefer that
sludge from these waste processes be retrograded from the continent,
rather than be dumped at sea.n
The fourth annex concerns "Prevention of Marine Pollution,"7
and is directly linked to the International Convention for the Prevention
on Pollution from Ships, as amended by its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL
73/78).7 Annex IV deals with discharges from ships, in particular oil,
noxious liquids, garbage, and sewage. Certain provisions also highlight
needs for vessel retention capacity, emergency response and preparedness.
Annex IV prohibits "any discharge of oil or oily mixture," save in
circumstances permitted under MARPOL 73/78.80 It also forbids "[t]he
discharge of any noxious liquid substance, and any other chemicals or
other substances, in quantities or concentrations that are harmful to the
marine environment,"8' and goes on to prohibit by name disposal into
the sea of two other categories of substances: (1) plastics, "including but
not limited to synthetic ropes, synthetic fishing nets, and plastic garbage
bags... ; " (2) all forms of garbage, "including paper products, rags,
glass, metal, bottles, crockery, dunnage, incineration ash, lining, and
packing materials .... "2 Parties are also obligated to "eliminate all
discharge of untreated sewage... within 12 nautical miles of land or ice

75. See Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex ILI, art. 5()(b), supra note 43, at 1481
(disposal of waste in the sea).
76. See Madrid Environmental Protocol, supra note 43, Annex M art. 5(1) at 1481.
77. ASOC Critique, supra note 54, at 8.
78. Madrid Environmental Protocol, supra note 43, Annex IV, at 1483.
79. International Convention for Preventing Pollution from Ships, IMCO Doc. MP/CONF/WP.35, done Nov. 2, 1973 (amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, IMCO Doc. TSPP/CONF/i, done
Feb. 17, 1978).
80. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex IV, art. 3, supra note 43, at 1483.
81. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex IV, art. 4, supra note 43, at 1484.
82. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex IV, art. 5, supra note 43, at 1484.
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shelves." Beyond that distance, any sewage discharge is to be made "at
a moderate rate of speed, and where practicable, while the ship is en
route at a speed of no less than 4 knots." An obvious loophole, however,
could undermine this fiat. As the preface to paragraph 1 of Article 6
suggests, this prohibition applies, "leixceptwhere it would unduly impair
Antarctic operations." Not only are the terms "unduly," "impair" and
"Antarctic operations" left undefined; determination of where and when
those conditions exist apparently is left to the discretion of vessel
operators. Such an open-ended provision might well be an invitation to
abuse and nonenforcement.
Enforcement for compliance is left to each contracting party to
exercise over ships flying their own flag or supporting that government's
Antarctic operations."4 Annex IV also binds flag states to ensure that all
their ships are fitted with retention tanks of sufficient capacity to retain
"all sludge, dirty ballast, tank washing water and other oily residues and
mixtures" while operating in the region. Contracting governments are
made responsible for ensuring that all ships flying their flags have
"sufficient capacity" on board for the retention of garbage while within
the Antarctic Treaty area' and have "adequate facilities" provided for
the reception of all sludge, dirty ballast, tank washing water, oily
residues, and garbage from all ships.
The marine pollution annex attempts to close gaps for sovereign
immunity left in previous instruments, though only with partial success.
Article 11 provides for sovereign immunity as it maintains that the annex
"shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, or other vessel owned
or operated by a State ..... Still, parties are obligated to "ensure by the
adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or
operational capabilities of such ships owned or operated by it, that such
ships act in a manner consistent, so far as reasonable and practicable"
with the annex. The problem here is obvious: Most vessels operating in
Antarctic waters are state-owned or operated. Consequently, most vessels
will qualify for the exception of sovereign immunity. To the extent that
determination of "appropriate measures" and "reasonable and practicable"
conditions for compliance remains at the discretion of vessel operators,
the possibility of violations is increased and the prospects for enforcement compliance are lowered. That situation remains unfortunate; it does
little to support the purposes of the annex and may in fact undermine the
prospects for preclusive restoration to be successfully implemented
throughout circumpolar waters.
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In October 1991 at the XVIth ATCM in Bonn, a fifth annex to the
Protocol was adopted. Annex V not only simplifies and significantly
expands the scope of the Antarctic protected area system; it also
supplies an integrated approach to the creation and management of
protected areas in the Antarctic.
Annex V consolidates the five existing categories of protected
areas under the Antarctic Treaty into two. The first category, Antarctic
Specially Protected Areas (APSAs), include areas that are to remain
inviolate from human interference, represent major human ecosystems or
are of outstanding environmental, scientific, historic, aesthetic or
wilderness value. Permits are required for entry into an ASPA. The
second category, Antarctic Specially Managed Areas (ASMAs), will
coordinate multiple-use activities occurring in the same area, presumably
to diminish potential for conflicts." While permits will not be required
in an ASMA, preparation of and compliance with a detailed management
will be necessary for each area.' Importantly, the concept of "sufficient
size to protect the values for which the special protection or management
is required" is stated,' which improves upon the previous "minimum
size requirement." Perusal of Annex V strongly suggests that the
Environment Committee will play a pivotal advisory role in the
management plan process, as also will the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR).
The Madrid Protocol consolidates environmental measures into
a single instrument under the Antarctic Treaty. Beforehand, environmental rules and regulations in the Antarctic Treaty System had been
negotiated on an ad hoc, piecemeal basis, with little linkage or substantive integration. The Madrid Protocol transforms that patchwork of rules
into a more comprehensive approach to environmental protection in
Antarctica, and in the process, provides channels for revising and
improving detailed measures as circumstances evolve. In effect, the
Protocol has become the mechanism for implementing preclusive
restoration for Antarctic Treaty states throughout the Antarctic area.

87. Annex V to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, reprinted
in Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System, supra note 17, at 2125.
88. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex V, art. 3, in Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty
System, supra note 17, at 2125.
89. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex V, art. 4, in Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty
System, supra note 17, at 2125-26.
90. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex V, art. 5, in Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty
System, supra note 17, at 2126-27.
91. Madrid Environmental Protocol, Annex V, art. 5(2), in Handbook of the Antarctic
Treaty System, supra note 17, at 2126-27.
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IV. THE BALANCE SHEET
Certain lessons have been learned from the experience of
applying preclusive restoration as a strategy for protecting the fragile
Antarctic ecosystem. Among them are the following:
I. Preclusive restoration is not merely a policy; it is a process,
comprised of at least three essential phases: (1) First, there is the
perception phase. A threat to a particular ecosystem is perceived, studied
and appraised; (2) Second, there occurs an agreement phase. Concerned
governments reach agreement on the need to cooperate in order to
prevent that threat from doing damage to the ecosystem; and (3) Third,
there is an action phase. Involved parties proceed to negotiate legally
,binding international agreements that prohibit activities that might
contribute to the perceived threat.
2. Interested governments must agree upon, adopt, and impleprinciples and common objectives that their strategy
fundamental
ment
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restoration
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3. For preclusive restoration to operate effectively, it is vital to
perceive even the possibility of an ecosystemic threat-and act on that
possibility-rather than wait for that threat to emerge into reality.
Preclusive restoration is preventive in intent and design. It is far more
desirable in terms of effort, costs and effectiveness than reactive
restoration-the process of cleaning up and rehabilitating the ecosystem
after considerable damage has been done.
4. The process of preclusive restoration must be permitted to
evolve. Preclusive restoration as a conservation strategy is not static; it is
dynamic. Accordingly, initial attempts at fashioning regulations might be
done piecemeal, in reaction to various potential problems as they surface.
It is essential, though, that a composite perspective of the entire
ecosystem be maintained and select policies of preclusive restoration be
linked together and integrated with other policies in the strategy.
5. Preclusive restoration can be maintained by creating an
international regime to administer and oversee the process. The establishment of an international regime to manage an ecosystem creates a
common purpose, guided by common objectives, for concerned states.
The nexus of international rules, norms and institutions that comprise the
regime must be negotiated by all parties, and must be agreeable to all

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

parties. Common values serving common national interests must
undergird the regime. Consensus decisionmaking can contribute
substantially to ensure this success.
6. Preclusive restoration is forward-looking. Common attitudes
for preclusive restoration foster policies restricting activities to ensure
prevention and protection. Initiatives for restrictive policies might come
from a single state concerned about a specific issue, or from a special
group meeting of select states, or from a general meeting of all concerned
governments. In any event, for preclusive restoration to work effectively,
all states conducting activities in that ecosystem must agree on the nature
of the policy, how it is to be implemented, and how it is to be enforced.
7. The critical ingredient for making preclusive restoration work
as a process is, of course, the political will among concerned governments
to make it do so. The legal instruments for preclusive restoration in the
Antarctic have been negotiated, and presumably the Madrid Protocol will
enter into force before long. Even so, the measure of success that comes
from effecting preclusive restoration in the Antarctic-and indeed,
anywhere-inevitably must rest with the degree of genuine commitment
by those national governments.
V. CONCLUSION
The fragile ecosystem throughout the Antarctic is being preserved
and protected by a multifaceted policy of preclusive restoration designed
and adopted by those states having the greatest interest and most
activities in the region. Since 1961 the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties have fashioned and applied international law to safeguard the
Antarctic from activities producing environmental degradation. Efforts
have been taken not only to prohibit despoliation of the continent
through new and reinforced international environmental law. Antarctic
Treaty governments have also negotiated specific agreements as
instruments of preclusive restoration for regulating pollution activities
that could directly threaten the Antarctic marine ecosystem. The Agreed
Measures, Seals Convention, CCAMLR, and the promulgation of a special
regulatory regime for mineral resources activities clearly attest to this
concern. The 1991 Madrid Environmental Protocol transforms these
regulations into a neater, tighter, more comprehensive legal package.
ATCP governments have made international laws protecting the
Antarctic environment, and those governments must enforce those laws
against nationals who violate them. The fault for degradation of the
Antarctic environment will lie neither in frail law nor in flawed policies
of preclusive restoration. The law and policy are clear. Rather, the fault
for failure will lie in a lack of political will among the ATCPs to monitor
activities, enforce compliance, and compel compensation for liability.

Fall 19941

FRAGILE ECOSYSTEMS

903

Preclusive restoration is not a panacea. As policy, it will work
only when and if its sponsors are willing to make it work. If the Antarctic
is to be preserved in its relatively pristine state, then sustaining the
necessary political will remains a critical precondition.
In the end, designing policies for preclusive restoration is not
enough. Implementing those policies is not enough. Successful preclusive
restoration insists that compliance with those policies be enforced by
involved governments and that new laws be made to fit evolving
environmental circumstances. For all states interested in the frozen south,
these are likely to remain the preeminent demands in coming decades for
protecting Antarctica's fragile ecosystem from human activities-and for
sustaining the efficacy of policies aimed at preclusive restoration
throughout the region.
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